Becker, Gary S. and Stigler, George J. () “Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers,” Journal of Legal Studies: Vol. 3: No. 1, Article . Loading data.. Open Bottom Panel. Go to previous Content Download this Content Share this Content Add This Content to Favorites Go to next Content. ← →. Gary S. Becker and George J. Stigler, “Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers,” The Journal of Legal Studies 3, no. 1 (Jan., ): 1
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THE new economic approach to political behavior seeks to develop a positive theory of legislation, in contrast to the normative approach of welfare economics. General contact details of provider: Mulligan University of Chicago.
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Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers
Crime, Punishment, and Institutions. Download PDF Cite this paper. Help us Corrections Found an error or omission? Ref 11 Source Add To Collection. This allows to link your profile to this item. The new approach asks why certain industries and not others become regulated or have tariffs imposed on imports or why income transfers take the form and direction they do, in contrast to asking which industries should be regulated or have tariffs imposed, or what transfers should be made.
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